Hjørland, Birger. “Semantics and Knowledge Organization.” ARIST 41 (2007): 367-405.

Originally read 18 June 2007 because it was cited by Zhang, J. (2007). Ontology and the Semantic Web. Proceedings of the North American Symposium on Knowledge Organization. Vol. 1. Available: http://dlist.sir.arizona.edu/1897

Re-read 28-29 Sep 2007 for two reasons: (1) Seems vastly relevant to my CAS project and (2) it is one of two articles referenced for Dr. Hjørland’s Research Fellow lecture [9 Oct 4-5 PM, Rm 126 GSLIS].

I will not be explicating this article as such here. I am going to use this post to note some of the points of contact that I noticed between Hjørland’s thoughts and Integrationism, to record and ask questions that I had and need to find an answer for, etc.

While some of my questions will be more directly to myself, please feel free to chime in on any of them. I am certainly willing to entertain authors other than Hjørland and Harris, but unless the question is specifically other-directed I will be looking primarily for an answer from within Integrationism and/or the “(the ’sociological-epistemological paradigm’ or the ‘domain analytic approach’)” (Hjørland, 1998, 611).

I think my primary complaint about this article revolves around just what does Hjørland mean by “semantics?” He never really provides a fully formed definition. At the bottom of the 3rd page (369) we find, “Because concepts provide the meaning behind words and semantics is the study of meaning, the study of concepts, meaning, and semantics should form one interdisciplinary field.” On the next page we find, “Semantics, by the way, is not concerned solely with word meaning. Pictures as well as other signs are also the objects of semantics” (370).

So, semantics is broader than just the word. OK, fully accepted. And it is the study of meaning. Probably OK. But then what is meant by “meaning?” Ah. Here’s the rub. The meaning of “meaning” is even slipperier than “truth” or “intelligence” or most any other hard-to-define word. Still. It would be useful to have some explicit idea of what Hjørland intends it to mean. I think I have a pretty clear idea, but then once in a while when I’m reading some line or paragraph I go, “Huh, so what is “semantics” or “meaning” in this case?”

I will add section headings along with page numbers to help give a better idea of where I am in the text.

Introduction: The Importance of Semantics for Information Science

The difference between “a word” and “a concept” is that different words may have the same meaning and similar words may have different meanings, whereas one concept expresses one meaning (367, emphasis mine).

Just a few months ago I would have taken this to be completely acceptable. But now? I don’t know. I was literally stopped in my tracks when I read this for the 2nd time. Assuming one is slightly familiar with various critiques of word meanings, how do we stipulate concepts as unitary? Is this an ontological definition or merely a stipulative one? How can it be anything other than stipulative, at least empirically? If I disagree and claim that concepts are not univocal then does this mean that no one shares any concepts? And then do we need another level above concepts? This quickly becomes an infinite regress as in various epistemological views of truth. Can we just declare a stopping point? Is this simply foundationalism re concepts?

Intergrationism has a way to deal with this regarding word meanings in language use so that we do not end up with individually personal languages while maintaining that there is no such thing as the language. Have a look and see if this can apply to concepts. And what is the integrational view (i.v.) of concepts anyway?

I see no way out of saying that this is a stipulative definition. Does that matter? Are concepts only a theoretical fiction? If so, is the work they do for us enough to offset this? [Note to others: I swear I'll ask one or two small questions. At least I hope I will!]

Quote from Soergel on thesauri (368). What is the i.v. of thesauri?

“It is thus important to include bibliometrics within the concept of KOS for both theoretical and practical reasons” (369). Handled correctly, can this be a reflection of integration? That is, reflections of the macrosocial and circumstantial parameters [see the section "Three integrational parameters." Will be using these a lot.] [see 2002d, 432-436]

On KOS:

Indeed, KOS in a narrow, IS-oriented sense are those systems related specifically to organizing bibliographical records (in databases), whereas KOS in a wide, general sense are related to the organization of literatures, traditions, disciplines, and people in different cultures (369).

Yes, context is very important. While I see myself as primarily working within the IS tradition, I want to generally be thinking in the broader sense, and working to import more of that sense into IS.

On semantic tools:

The term “semantic tool” should be reserved for systems that provide selections of concepts more or less enriched with information about semantic relations; KOS should be used as a broader term including, but not limited to, semantic tools.

The field of KO within IS is thus concerned with the construction, use, and evaluation of semantic tools for IR (369).

While I tend to agree with this it does seem a bit arbitrary or, at least, preliminary as “semantic” has never truly been defined. Nonetheless, I am probably in agreement.

Relation of concepts, words and meaning:

Because concepts provide the meaning behind words … (369).

Do they? Again, what is the i.v. of concepts?

The Status of Semantic Research in Information Science

Van Rijsbergen (1986, p. 194) has pointed out that the concept of meaning has been overlooked in IS and discussed why the whole area is in crisis. The fundamental basis of all the previous work—including his own—is wrong, he claims, because it has been based on the assumption that a formal notion of meaning is not required to solve IR problems (370).

Is there a formal notion of “meaning” in the i.v.? Probably not. Is one required for IS? I do believe so, tentatively anyway. Get and read van Rijsbergen. OK, read van Rijsbergen. Formal definition in this sense means formally specific and thus machine implementable.

Outline of traditions within KO:

Broughton, Hansson, Hjørland, and López-Huertas (2005) have suggested the following traditions are the most important ones for KO: … (371).

Need to read Broughton, et. al. (already have it). Will be useful for one of the overview sections where I am setting up the problem.

On the domain-analytic tradition:

The domain-analytic approach is rather traditional in its identification of semantic relations based on literary warrant. However, it is not positivist, for it regards semantic relations as determined by theories and epistemologies, which more or less influence all fields of knowledge (372).

OK, but what about communicational context? The macrosocial other than epist. or theoretical, and the circumstantial?

Semantics and the Philosophy of Science

Justification for taking a “radical” view (and so much more):

The different theories and epistemologies that are in competition with one another may be more or less fruitful (or harmful) for information science. It is important to realize this and to take the risk of defending a particular theory. If this is not done, other views will never be sufficiently falsified, confirmed, or clarified. In the process of defending a particular view, one learns what other views it is necessary to reject. As pragmatist philosophers have long suggested, in order to make our thoughts clear, we have to ask what practical consequences follow from taking one or another view (or meaning) as true. If our theory (or meaning) does not have any practical implications, then it is of no consequence (372, emphasis mine).

Amen!

Peregrin suggests two dominant paradigms in semantics: positivist and pragmatic. (Read Peregrin 30 Sep)

Pragmatist semantics suggests that expressions are tools for interaction and their meanings are their functions within the interaction, giving them the capacity to support it in their distinctive way (Hjørland, 373)

Hjørland cites Harris’ (2005) The semantics of science in an endnote at this point. So he is clearly aware of Harris.

Hjørland and Nissen Perdersen (2005) on the foundations of a theory of classification for IR:

4. Selected “properties of the objects to be classified must reflect the purpose of the classification” (373). This is contextual and should be an aid to integration.

6. To serve their differing purposes, different domains may well “need different descriptions and classifications of objects…” (373). This is also contextual and macrosocial.

10. “The criteria for classification should be based on an understanding of the specific goals, values, and interests at play” (374). Also possibly integrational at the macrosocial and/or circumstantial levels.

Several of the other points are also somewhat integrational.

“I agree that meanings and classification criteria are implicit in the literature to be retrieved, as outlined here” (375, emphasis mine). Hmmm? i.v.?

This section ends with Hjørland’s take on Putnam and a listing of three points of departure for both, which sound fairly integrational. Maybe not the 1st, though.

• A focus on the relation between meaning and the real world (realism)
• A focus on the functional/pragmatic nature of meaning (pragmatism)
• A focus on the development of meaning is a social context (historicism and meaning collectivism/holism) (375)

Semantics and Subject Knowledge

End of quote from Bada, et. al. on domain models requiring expertise from within the community to construct them reflects the macrosocial (376).

Ideas on the education of LIS professionals and subject knowledge (377). Can this be given an i.v. spin?

Stay tuned. Or not. There’s a lot more of this paper….

Citations from within this Hjørland paper:

Broughton, V., et. al. (2005). Knowledge organization: Report of working group 7. In L. Kajberg & L. Lørring (Eds.), European Curriculum Reflections on Education in Library and Information Science. Copenhagen: Royal School of Library and Information Science. Retrieved December 15, 2005, from www.db.dk/LIS-EU/workshop.asp

Hjørland , B. & Nissen Perdersen, K. (2005). A substantive theory of classification for information retrieval. Journal of Documentation, 61, 582-597. Retrieved December 15, 2005, from www.db.dk/bh/Core%20Concepts%20in%20LIS/Hjorland%20&%20Nissen.pdf [Verified October 1, 2007]

van Rijsbergen, C. J. (1986). A new theoretical framework for information retrieval. Proceedings of the Annual International ACM SIGIR Conference on Research and Developments in Information Retrieval, 194-200.

External citations:

Hjørland, Birger. “Theory and Metatheory of Information Science: A New Interpretation.” Journal of Documentation. 54.5 (1998): 606-621.