Hjørland, Birger. “Semantics and Knowledge Organization.” ARIST 41 (2007): 367-405.
Originally read 18 June 2007 because it was cited by Zhang, J. (2007). Ontology and the Semantic Web. Proceedings of the North American Symposium on Knowledge Organization. Vol. 1. Available: http://dlist.sir.arizona.edu/1897
Re-read 28-29 Sep 2007 for two reasons: (1) Seems vastly relevant to my CAS project and (2) it is one of two articles referenced for Dr. Hjørland’s Research Fellow lecture [9 Oct 4-5 PM, Rm 126 GSLIS].
I will not be explicating this article as such here. I am going to use this post to note some of the points of contact that I noticed between Hjørland’s thoughts and Integrationism, to record and ask questions that I had and need to find an answer for, etc.
Semantics and Its “Warrant”
Theories of semantics should be formulated in ways that provide methodological implications for determining meanings and relations in semantic tools such as thesauri and semantic networks. Often such theories are not clear; this renders the theories vague and unhelpful (377).
What does i.v. say on this?
Frohmann (1983) has discussed the semantic bases and theoretical principles of some classification system. His is one of the few papers in IS to recognize that problems in classification should be seen as problems related to semantic theories (378).
Read this 19 June 2007; re-read this for an i.v. angle?
Frohmann presents two semantic theories. … According to the second, the categories to which a concept belongs must be found in the specific literature or discourse of which the associated term is a part. Consequently, the semantic relations are not given a priori, but are formulated a posteriori. This distinction has implications for classification theory (378).
Oh boy, does it ever?
Thus, a basic problem in KO is whether semantic relations are a priori or a posteriori; … (378).
This question is also related to one about the possibility of universal solutions to KO because a posteriori relations are unlikely to be universal (379).
Is there a way to incorporate both? How would be go about truly trying to incorporate a posteriori relationships?
However, it is well known that, for example, synonyms are seldom synonyms in all contexts. It thus becomes important not to think of semantic relations as simply “given,” but to ask: When are two concepts A and B to be considered synonyms ( or homonyms or otherwise semantically related?) When is a semantic relation? We should again ask the pragmatist question: What difference does it make whether, in a given situation, we choose to consider A and B as semantically related in a specific way? (379, emphases mine).
This certainly made me think of Harris (1973). What is the i.v. on “When is a semantic relation?”?
Short discussion of Ogden and Richard’s (1923) triangle of meaning/semiotic triangle (379-380). Where did I see Harris’ take on this?
Hjørland then goes on to discuss “some theoretical possibilities about the nature of concepts and semantic relations: (379):
- Query/situation specific or idiosyncratic
- Universal, Platonic entities/relations
- “Deep semantics” common to all languages (or inherent in cognitive structures)
- Specific to specific empirical languages (e.g., Swedish)
- Domain- or discourse-specific
- Other (e.g., determined by a company or workgroup, “user-oriented”)
Concerning Query/Situation-Specific or Idiosyncratic Semantics
In a way, it is the specific “information need” that determines which relations are fruitful and which are not in a given search session. A semantic relation that increases recall and precision in a given search [is a mighty powerful relationship!] is relevant in that situation (380-381, plus my commentary).
The pragmatic fallback is well represented in this quote:
This pragmatist point of departure is important to keep in mind in developing a theory of concepts and semantics. Semantic relations relate to a given task or situation and not all users of a given set of semantic relations will share the same view of which terms are equivalent. On the other hand, it is clear that if we base a semantic theory on an individual/idiosyncratic view of concepts and semantics, it is not possible to design systems for more than one user or situation—an absurd conclusion. We need more stable principles on which to determine semantic relations. We need a semantic theory about the meaning of words as forms of typified practices. Knowledge about semantics in typified practices may then be used by information searchers in order to include or exclude certain documents (381).
Concerning Universal, Platonic Entities/Relations
Not much to say here. Is a very short section. I will be looking at the following articles, both of which are in AKO 8:
Green, Rebecca. “Conceptual Universals in Knowledge Organization and Representation” (15-27) and Green, Rebecca, Carol A. Bean and Michèle Hudon, “Universality and Basic Level Concepts” (311-317).
I’ll also be looking at both Green, et. al. books on relationships for a refresh. You all didn’t think I had forgotten about Dr. Green, did you?
Concerning “Deep Semantics” Common to All Languages or Inherent in Cognitive Structures (A Priori Relations)
Semantic primitives in concept theory and in IS. Innate ideas (rationalistic) in semantics, facet-analytic tradition (Ranganathan) and formal concept analysis (Priss).
Although this rationalist theory dominates the literature (and is associated with the cognitive view), I do not find it fruitful for KO (384).
More talk about science, what is his view on KO in non-science areas?
Concerning Semantics Specific to Given Empirical Languages
Natural languages are structures in which the words classify the world differently (384).
Hjelmslev’s “tree” chart.
Concerning Domain- or Discourse-Specific Semantics
Although objects have objective properties, representation of those properties in languages and concepts is always more or less “subjective” or “biased” by individuals, social groups, or different cultures (385).
Objects may well have subjective properties also.
The implication is that semantic relations reflect human interests. … This does not imply that all semantic relations are domain-specific (385).
Certainly does not.
Goes on to show that we need to evaluate the literatures of specific domains or discourses to identify and analyze the different methodologies and assumptions made as an aid to determining meaning.
In this way, meanings are linked to different views, interests, and goals; accordingly, terms can be generally considered polysemous. [en 7] Attempts to standardize terminology may unwittingly suppress certain views (387).
Or wittingly suppress. See early Harris on standardization. Is also a comment on definitions and definitional change. Endnote 7 is a comment on the German tradition of Begriffsgeschichte, discussed in the section on semantic relations (en7, 396). [Need to look at this.]
Aspergum vs. Ecotrin vs. aspirin = i.v., circumstantial.
The implication of different paradigms for KO and semantics is that any bibliography of a certain size must confront conflicting ways of defining concepts and determining semantic relations (388).
There is a trade-off between being an optimal tool for the information seeker and a practical tool for the library manager. For the theory of IS, it is nonetheless important to describe the principles of designing optimal search tools (388-389). [the pragmatic fallback]
The point is that the kind of information presented here is necessary for any informed decision about classification practice. Exactly the same kind of information would be helpful for the information seeker … (389). [the macrosocial feeding the circumstantial]
Perhaps the most important task of the information professional is to make the different interests and paradigms visible so that the user can make an informed choice (390). [How does this fit within an i.v.?]
Other Kinds of Warrant
Discusses Beghtol’s (1986) article on warrant. But what about “user warrant” (390)? [Have another read of Beghtol]
Mentions oral and written sources.
Semantic Relations
Relations between concepts. senses, or meanings should not be confused with relations between the terms, words, expressions, or signs that are used to express the concepts. It is, however, common to mix both of these kinds of relations under the heading “semantic relations” (see references omitted). For this reason, synonyms, homonyms, and so forth, are considered under the label “semantic relations” in this chapter (391).
Amen! But much harder in practice to keep these straight or even to see the difference. [See preceding paragraphs to the above quote for some explication.]
On the call for richer sets of relationships in our tools and a a critique of the recall/precision view of IR:
What information searchers need are maps that inform them about the world (and the literature about that world) in which they live and act (393).
Begriffsgeschichte (is this idea of use to me?) = conceptual history.
Historians and other humanistic researchers have realized that in order to use sources from a given period, one must know what the terms meant at the time. Therefore, they have developed impressive historical dictionaries that provide detailed information about conceptual developments within different domains, … (393).
Implication of broadening the view within IS to use important work on semantic relations is that “different domains need different kinds of semantic tools displaying different kinds of semantic relations” (393). Well, this actually follows from much of the previous discussion, but this view implies that we need to look more broadly.
The “Intellectual” Versus the Social Organization of Knowledge
On citations are semantic relations:
I hold that the citing relation is in itself a kind of semantic relation. In support of this claim, I distinguish between “ontological” and social semantic relations and argue that citing relations belong to the latter (394).
Discusses further the difference between and uses of these.
Conclusion
The pragmatist view of semantics suggests that words and expressions are tools for interaction and their meanings are their functions within the interaction, constituting their capacities to serve it in their distinctive ways. [Integrationist] When information professionals classify documents or informational objects, the relevant meanings and properties are available only on the basis of some descriptions. This important consideration, … , stands in opposition to the prevailing implicit assumption that all relevant properties are obvious to the information specialists and that the latter follow certain given principles providing an optimal classification that is objective, neutral, and universal—hence, technically efficient (395, emphases mine).
I am not going to argue that no one thinks that way—some do—but I sure would like to put them to work on some real world projects so they can quickly learn the folly of their blindered thinking.
Traditional approaches to KO have a tighter affiliation with positivism than with the pragmatist view of semantics. … The implication is that traditional views have provided solutions that are, at best, statistical averages and thus sub-optimal (396).
No disagreement from me on this one. In fact, one could say that first sentence is what is driving me to this topic in the first place, urgently prodded along by the works of Roy Harris. And while I agree with the second sentence, what corners will need to be cut due to the pragmatic fallback? Hjørland has pointed to this himself several times in this paper; see above in a couple of places.
This is a very good paper, despite all my questioning of it. I will be spending more time with it I can assure you as it will most likely serve as a cornerstone of my CAS project. I agree with the vast majority of it, and several months back, before I had read so much Harris and related integrationist critiques, I accepted even more of it.
Citations from within this Hjørland paper:
Beghtol, C. (1986). Semantic validity: Concepts of warrant in bibliographic classification systems. Library Resources & Technical Services, 30 109-125.
Frohmann, B. P. (1983). An investigation of the semantic bases of some theoretical principles of classification proposed by Austin and the CRG. Cataloging & Classification Quarterly 4: 11-27.
External citations:
Harris, Roy. Synonymy and Linguistic Analysis. Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1973.
López-Huertas, Mariá, and International Society for Knowledge Organization. Challenges in knowledge representation and organization for the 21st century : integration of knowledge across boundaries : proceedings of the seventh international ISKO conference, 10-13 July 2002,. Würzburg: Ergon-Verlag, 2002 [Advances in Knowledge Organization v. 8].
2 responses so far ↓
1 Nathan // Oct 10, 2007 at 7:15 am
Mark,
I will try to check myself sometime soon, but here is a question that popped into my mind: Does Hjørland at any point define “positivism”?
No response expected (just something to think on and incorporate into your “all things considered” approach).
2 Birger Hjorland // Oct 18, 2007 at 12:12 pm
did I try to define positivism, yes, in many papers, among them this one:
Hjørland, B. (2005). Empiricism, rationalism and positivism in library and information science. Journal of Documentation, 61(1), 130-155. Available at: http://www.db.dk/binaries/empiricism%5Fp.130-155.pdf