Feminist / Alternative Epistemologies

      In this paper I will outline the views of Susan Bordo, in "The Cartesian Masculinization of Thought and the Seventeenth-Century Flight from the Feminine," and of Elizabeth Anderson, in "Feminist Epistemology: An Interpretation and a Defense." I will explain why they constitute a challenge to the Cartesian project, outline their negative critique of traditional epistemology, and list some of their positive alternatives. I will then assess these views.

      Susan Bordo, in "The Cartesian Masculinization of Thought and the Seventeenth-Century Flight from the Feminine," puts forth the thesis that the objectification of knowledge, commonly attributed as starting with Rene Descartes, took place in a specific historical and cultural context. This context, which was a reaction to events of the time, both natural and societal, resulted in Cartesian objectivism and mechanism, and "should be understood as a reaction-formation – a denial of the "separation anxiety"…, facilitated by an aggressive flight from the female cosmos and "feminine" orientation towards the world." (Bordo 100)

      She argues that a "participating consciousness," or more feminine viewpoint had played a significant role in medieval and Renaissance thought and culture. The key term in this alternative scheme of values "might be designated as sympathy. "Sympathetic" understanding of the object is that which understands it through "union" with it." (Bordo 102) The "dissolution of the medieval intellectual and imaginative system," resulted in the loss of "a world in which the human being could feel nourished by the sense of oneness, of continuity between all things. The new infinite universe was an indifferent home, an "alien will," and the sense of separateness from her was acute." (Bordo 110-111) She specifically looks at the century from 1550 – 1650. This period, which saw many revolutions in scientific thought, was also a period of violent wars, plaque, poverty, and the worst food shortage in history. Descartes is fully a product of this time, having lived from 1596 – 1650. She notes that it has been shown that boys tend "to grow up learning to experience the world like Cartesians, while girls do not, because of developmental asymmetries resulting from female-dominated infant care, rather than biology, anatomy, or "nature."" (Bordo 113) This mode of infant care is noted to be a product of the sixteenth century. Prior to this time, very little nurturing of either sex took place. All of this put together resulted in the Cartesian project, the separation of subject and object, which caused the masculinization of knowledge and the suppression of the "feminine" way of knowing the world.

      This viewpoint is a radical challenge to the Cartesian project. "The Cartesian ideal of the detached, purely neutral observer is here viewed as a type of mystification, and the ideals of absolute objectivity and ultimate foundations seen as requiring historical examination." (Bordo 117) Bordo claims that a natural foundation for knowledge is created by what she calls "sympathy," that is through closeness, connectedness, and empathy, not through the distance and detachment of the Cartesian project. She argues that any rationality – "feminine" or "masculine" – that operates exclusively in one mode without drawing on the resources of the other is insufficient. She states that only by "establishing the scientific and philosophical legitimacy of alternative modes of knowing in the public arena (rather than glorifying them in their own special sphere of family relations) do we present a real alternative to Cartesianism." (Bordo 114)

      Bordo's critique of traditional epistemology centers on the limits of the masculine Cartesian model and how tightly it has held modern philosophy in its grip. She feels that "our culture needs to reconceive the status of what Descartes assigned to the shadows." (Bordo 116) The Cartesian model has suppressed and masked alternative voices. This 'dominance' of Cartesian thought is now suspect. It has denied the legitimacy of alternative perspectives and must tell the secret story of the historical and political circumstances of its own dominance.

      One positive alternative offered is the gender-neutralitization of knowledge, in which it is not feminized or de-masculinized, but recognized that each mode when cut off from the other gives only partial truths about human experience. Secondly, if society starts to change due to the exposure of gender biases in our concepts of science and ethics, then due to different social climates, men may begin to think more "like women" and women may begin to think more "like men." All in all, she feels that "it is too soon to tell what sort of impact feminist and other reconstructions will have on the future development of philosophy, not to mention on the general intellectual and political life of our culture." (Bordo 117)

      Elizabeth Anderson, in "Feminist Epistemology: An Interpretation and a Defense," begins her paper with the statement that "feminist epistemology is better understood as a branch of naturalized, social epistemology that studies the various influences of norms and conceptions of gender and gendered interests and experiences on the production of knowledge." (Anderson 50) She argues, contrary to the view of some feminine epistemologists, that excellent prospects for advancing a feminist epistemology of theoretical knowledge can be had within a naturalized empiricist epistemology. She claims two aims for the project of feminist epistemology with regards to theoretical knowledge. The first is to explain the achievements of feminist criticism of science. "An adequate feminist epistemology must explain what it is for a scientific theory or practice to be sexist and androcentric, how these features are expressed in theoretical inquiry and in the application of theoretical knowledge, and what bearing these features have on evaluating research." (Anderson 51) Secondly, the project aims to defend feminist scientific practices. "An adequate feminist epistemology must explain how research projects with such moral and political commitments can produce knowledge that meets such epistemic standards as empirical adequacy and fruitfulness." (Anderson 51) Anderson argues that these aims can be satisfied while retaining commitments to a modest empiricism and to rational inquiry.

      Anderson defines empiricism as the view that all the evidence that we have about the world is ultimately provided by experience. In her definition of empiricism, no conceivable hypothesis can be ruled out by any thought process operating independently of empirical evidence. This implies two things. First, that "anything can cause anything, and anything might provide an illuminating fruitful model for any other phenomenon." (Anderson 51-52) Secondly, this implies that we must freely and fully develop our imaginations if we expect to discover the best theories. Anderson rejects the common meaning of empiricism that imposes a priori restrictions on the kinds of things and ideas that science can take seriously. She thus defines moderate empiricism "to be a purely methodological doctrine, which rejects a priori commitments to what the content of our theories and models must be." (Anderson 52)

      Next, Anderson defines reason and shows why reason as "reflective self-government" rejects the Cartesian ideal of "individualistic self-sufficiency." (Anderson 53) Thus, rational inquiry truly is a social enterprise. This can see seen in the fact that for something to count as empirical evidence in supporting or rejecting a theory it must be "publicly accessible" and it must be reproducible. Also, others rely on the tools, concepts, methods, data collection and even data interpretation of others to conduct their inquiries. This social character implies two things. First, that the social relations of the inquirers may impact upon theories produced. And secondly, that "insofar as we reflectively reject certain ways that gender influences the practices and products of inquiry, we need not try correct these problems by demanding that individual investigators somehow abstract from their gender or gender-related values and commitments." (Anderson 53) She feels that the proper checks and balances will be in place if "the social relations of inquirers are well arranged." (Anderson 53)

      Anderson feels that when questions of feminist epistemology are framed as empirical questions, that mainstream theorists, whom she says are mainly empiricists, will not be able to responsibly ignore them. Some of these empirical questions are: How the historical omission of women from most fields of inquiry has affected the direction and content of that research? How various fields, such as medicine, would be different if we looked at things from the point of view of women instead?

      Anderson divides the claims of feminist epistemologists into four types. The first is gender structures which "focus on the ways gender norms structure the division of labor in society." (Anderson 57) The second, "gender symbolism, occurs when we represent nonhuman or inanimate phenomena as "masculine" or "feminine" and model them after gender ideals or stereotypes." (Anderson 57) Gender symbolism structures our hierarchy of knowledge and figures in the content of theories as well. The third type, androcentrism occurs when theories take the "masculine" or males and their lives to be the norm for humans or animals. Female differences are either ignored or considered as deviant. The fourth, sexism in theory, "can appear either in practices that apply the theory or in the content of the theory itself." (Anderson 58) Anderson takes us through these four claims one by one, shows them to be valid, and shows us the types of empirical questions that they generate.

      Certain epistemic values such as simplicity, prediction, and control may seem to support Cartesian linear, structural causal models of human behavior. But she has shown that control, at least, is a contested epistemic value. Also, "the kind of simplicity one favors depends on one's aesthetic values." (Anderson 79) Certain other epistemic values, though, such as fruitfulness, seem to favor complex nonlinear causal models of human behavior. Read these as naturalized, social (feminist) epistemological models.

      Anderson concludes with the thoughts that "feminist contributions to theorizing are more usefully conceived as altering the field of theoretical possibilities" and that since "men and women do have some gender-specific experiences and personal knowledge due to different socialization and social status" that, therefore, naturalized epistemology "recommends that the scientific community include a diversity of inquirers who accept different background assumptions." (Anderson 81, 80, 79)

      Anderson's moderate empiricism is a challenge to the Cartesian project in that she rejects the a priori commitments of 'standard' empiricism, and that she considers rational inquiry to be a social enterprise. Knowledge is not sought in a Cartesian 'vacuum.'

      Her negative critique of traditional epistemology is shown throughout her paper by multiple examples. But, it boils down to the fact that traditional epistemology hasn't got us to the right place. Gendered structures get us barriers, at all levels, to women in academia. Men's claims are given greater credibility and respect, and thus greater epistemic authority, than are women's. This structure slows the progress of, and even changes the content of, knowledge. Gender symbolism has structured the hierarchy of knowledge. Physics is the most prestigious science because it is "harder," more like the male body, and its language, mathematics, is masculine. Sexist gender symbolism in theories gives "extraordinary political salience and rhetorical power to sexist gender ideology, which generates numerous cognitive distortions." (Anderson 68) One way in which androcentrism fails, is that androcentric theories, which take only the masculine perspective, or masculinity as norm, and then apply them to everyone are empirically inadequate. The application of scientific theories may be sexist either directly or indirectly. A directly sexist application is one that is used to provide "ideological justification for patriarchal structures." (Anderson 76) An indirect sexist application of a theory is one that takes "certain sexist values for granted rather than trying to justify them." (Anderson 76) These, and other examples, add up to a pretty substantial critique of traditional epistemology.

      Anderson's alternatives to traditional epistemology have already been stated, if not explicitly so far. We must begin to empirically question the various influences of gendered concepts and norms on the production of knowledge. This can be aided by rejecting any Cartesian a priori constraints on what can count as a theory or model, and by rejecting "the positivist view that the epistemic merits of theories can be assessed independently of their ideological applications." (Anderson 77) By expanding the scientific community with a mixture of researchers with different background assumptions, we will go far in answering the sorts of empirical questions generated by a naturalized, social epistemology.

      I believe that the primary difference between Susan Bordo and Elizabeth Anderson, as revealed by the papers that I read, is more in their style of writing. Their aims appear to be the same to me. Bordo speaks a lot looser than Anderson and includes more 'feminist' rhetoric, while Anderson gives a much more straightforward, dare I say, 'rational' account. Anderson gives many more examples of the influences of gender bias on the sciences and the production of knowledge. And, by giving us specific empirical questions that can, and I believe should, be answered she has given us a way to begin removing these biases where and when it is appropriate.

      I have always questioned many of the gendered assumptions that Bordo and Anderson point out. Maybe the process of socialization that I went through was not complete in turning me into a purely masculine Cartesian knower. I have experienced the world in many different ways, such as through music, for example, and in many different places and cultures. I have not always automatically hit that which I did not know over the head with a big rock. I know from personal experience that there are different ways of seeing the world, different world-versions as Goldman would say. It may be that some world-version is epistemically superior to the others, but that is a subject for empirical study. I look forward to the changes within philosophy, and even more importantly within society and politics, that these two epistemologists are trying to bring about.