In Book X of the Nichomachean Ethics, Aristotle argues that "It would seem to be clear, then, that pleasure is not the good…" (1174a10). In this paper I will present the first of the reasons that Aristotle gives in support of his claim that pleasure is not "the good." Then I will critically evaluate whether I believe this reason to be persuasive or not. Finally, I will give a quick overview of one of Aristotle's reasons that I do believe is convincing.
Aristotle's first point is that "The difference between a friend and a flatterer seems to indicate that pleasure is not good, or else that pleasure differs in species." (1173b34). He claims that friends aim at the good when dealing with us, but that flatterers aim at what is pleasant. Moreover, we praise friends for their behavior, while we reproach the flatterer for his. This, Aristotle tells us, is because we assume that they have different aims. (1173b35 – 1174a3).
There are two unstated assumptions in this passage. One is fairly easy to see while the other rests on Aristotle's discussion of 'friendship' in Book VIII. When Aristotle claims that "the friend seems to aim at what is good…" (1174a1) he is referring to 'perfect friendship.' "Perfect friendship is the friendship of men who are good, and alike in virtue; for these wish well alike to each other qua good, and they are good in themselves." (1156b6-10). He is not referring to friendships of utility or pleasure. The second assumption has to do with the different aims of a friend and a flatterer. A friend aims at what is good when dealing with me because he wishes good for me irrespective of any utility or pleasure he might receive by doing so. The flatterer, on the other hand, has ulterior motives in aiming at the pleasant. He intends to disarm me through pleasant flattery so as to achieve some aim beneficial to him. If this is friendship at all, it is friendship of utility. The flatterer hopes to achieve something useful for himself.
I agree with Aristotle in that we do praise our friends for aiming at the good for us and we do reproach people, who use flattery, although possibly pleasant, to obtain utility for themselves. There is a saying that, "Imitation is the sincerest form of flattery;" but we punish this form of flattery vigorously through laws against copyright and trademark violations. If pleasure, as received from flattery, were 'the good,' we would not likely have laws against it.
Secondly, I do not believe that flattery is pleasurable. A flatterer, prior to being found out, may be pleasant, but once the flattery is discovered for what it is, it is no longer pleasant. There is currently an acquaintance of mine who uses flattery to try and make me feel important and useful to "the cause." All this accomplishes is to make me even more upset with this person. Thus, this argument of Aristotle's fails. It is simply not convincing. I do not believe that his next two arguments are very convincing either. But, he is correct when he says that pleasure is not "the good." The successful argument comes a little later in Book X.
Aristotle argues that pleasures can be good or bad, and that they vary in quality and degree of goodness. That is, pleasures are of different species. He uses the example of the lover of flutes attempting to follow a conversation while distracted by flute playing. (1175b1-5). The pleasure of hearing flutes impedes the activity of conversation for this person. Thus, "an alien pleasure does virtually what a proper pain does." (1175b17). That is, it destroys an activity. If pleasures can be good or bad, or vary in quality, as this and other arguments show, then pleasure can not be "the good."
Aristotle maintains that each activity has a pleasure that is proper to it. "Since activities differ in degrees of decency and badness, and some are choiceworthy, some to be avoided, some neither, the same is true of pleasures; for each activity has its own proper pleasure." (1175b24-26). What is it then that pleasure does? What is its role in 'the good life?'
Aristotle claims that "Pleasure completes the activity – not, however, as the state does, by being present [in the activity], but as a sort of consequent end, like the bloom on youths." (1174b33-35). If pleasure completes an activity, and activities differ in whether they should be pursued or not, and each activity has its own proper pleasure, which activities and pleasures should one pursue?
Aristotle says that "In all such cases it seems that what is really so is what appears to be so to the excellent person. If this is correct, as it seems to be, and virtue, i.e. the good person in so far as he is good, is the measure of each thing, then what appear pleasures to him will also be pleasures, and what is pleasant will be what he enjoys." (1176a17-19). He goes on to claim that "Hence the pleasures that complete the activities of the complete and blessedly happy man, whether he has one activity or more than one, will be called the human pleasures to the fullest extent." (1176a27-29).
I agree with Aristotle that pleasure differs in species and degree. Some things are simply more pleasurable than others are, stronger pleasures can destroy weaker ones, and some should not be pursued. I also agree that pleasure of the kind proper to a specific activity does supervene on the activity, at least when it is done well. I disagree with Aristotle when he claims that we must simply look to the 'complete and blessedly happy man' to determine which are the proper pleasures. Certainly, if there is such a man, in the Aristotelian sense, then the pleasures that he enjoys must be proper. But, he may not enjoy all of the proper pleasures. Also, how are we to recognize this 'complete and blessedly happy man?'
Aristotle has many excellent ideas about pleasure and its role in 'the good life.' But, he relies too much on this hypothetical 'complete and blessedly happy man.' Who is he? Where is he? And how do we recognize him when we find him?
I chose to write about the friend/flatterer example because "friendship" has become a critical factor in my life in the last year or two. I have never had many close friends, but those that I do, or have, had are quite probably the dearest things that I have ever known. Many of my current 'friends' are of a different opinion, though, than Aristotle or myself. They seem to be primarily concerned with utility and pleasure. I do not know if this is due to youth, the age difference, or if it is something that is defective in them or me. I choose not to believe that it is me that misunderstands the true meaning of friendship. Maybe I have a biased view, as I do give myself credit for having a better epistemological standpoint on the matter than they do. It might be age discrimination on my part, but after reading Book VIII I am now convinced that I have a much better understanding of the concept of "friendship" than the typical 20-year-old, ISU student does.
Aristotle, Nichomachean Ethics, in Classics of Moral and Political Theory, 2nd ed., Michael L. Morgan, editor. Hackett Publishing, Indianapolis, IN, 1996.
Aristotle, The Nichomachean Ethics of Aristotle, Sir David Ross, transl. Oxford University Press, London, 1966.